BRICS urgently needs some mortar
BRICS as a group of large developing economies is too diverse politically and culturally to be the nucleus of a future global organization or a force to counter the West’s hegemony. But the current Sino-Indian mutual incomprehension carries the danger of turning this promising group into another SAARC.
The 14th BRICS Summit is scheduled for later this month in Beijing. The group comprises five emerging economies — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The theme for BRICS-2022 is ‘Foster High-Quality BRICS Partnership: Usher in a New Era for Global Development.’ Its agenda is rather too long and ambitious: multilateralism, political and security cooperation, international law and justice, public global economic governance, an open and innovative world economy, and maintaining steady supply chains. Health cooperation with a particular focus on vaccine research, sustainable development and poverty alleviation, start-up cooperation, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, building a low-carbon and green circular economy to achieve the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement, and many more.
However, Russia’s ongoing special operation in Ukraine has dramatically complicated the BRICS agenda. The US and EU response to the Ukraine conflict has created financial turbulence that shook the world and put BRICS in a tight spot. As a result, the sanctions are likely to be the summit’s focus of the discussions. The five leaders will navigate the crucial dilemma involving a common stance on the Russian-Ukraine conflict. They are expected to stand by Russia to counter-sanctions, thereby in confrontation with the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). It will be against individual members’ national interests, and they wish to avoid the confrontation. India, China, Brazil, and South Africa have much at stake in their relations with the West. The west, on its part, is not expecting the BRICS to adhere to the sanctions in equal measure. But thinking that they will continue with this attitude is naïve and unrealistic. So far, not a single BRICS country has supported Western sanctions against Russia. Still, this does not mean they are ready to boldly enhance cooperation, turning a blind eye to understandable threats of secondary sanctions from the US and the EU. BRICS nations fear one day they could be potential targets of the new kind of total economic warfare deployed by the West against Russia.
The situation that emerged out of the Russia-Ukraine conflict could also be an ideal time for a reckoning of the BRICS’ core agenda of rebalancing an international system dominated by the West and its role as the leading force for global economic governance reform and call for action to challenge such unipolar decisions.
Economically, militarily, and technologically, BRICS represents a powerful bloc in world politics. The combined map of geography, history, demography, population sizes, economic outputs, and culture are on their side. They have an estimated combined population of 3.23 billion people, which is over 40 percent of the world population, over more than a quarter of the world’s land area on three continents. They account for more than 25 percent of global GDP at the US $23.53 trillion, with India and China as the fastest-growing economies in the world.
BRICS has managed to institutionalize its status as the emerging powers’ club by successfully establishing the New Development Bank (NDB) and Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA). But it cannot match the West’s economic might shortly. It is still far away from having its payment mechanisms, international messaging systems, or cards to match the financial ecosystem of the West. However, the new geopolitical reality and the current situation where so much is in flux create a space for a powerful new narrative by BRICS that doesn’t rely on US-led institutions and the dollar. But the success of the new narrative will depend on whether the current crisis is seen as a game-changer and an opportunity and, more importantly, its members’ unity and political will.
Unity among the BRICS partners does not seem easy. Especially between India and China with their current tense relationship post-Galwan conflict. Beijing’s stance on territorial issues and its claims to the South China sea remains a concern for India. It is assumed that Beijing is unlikely to be as blatant as Moscow in pursuing its strategic goals. Nevertheless, China’s geopolitical goals pose a dilemma for India, resulting in some mistrust of China and reluctance to confront the West. Moreover, unlike China, India is neither a permanent member of the UN Security Council nor has significant tensions and confrontation with the West – or any other BRICS member. India cannot be depicted as pro-West either; nevertheless, it enjoys reasonably good relations with the West. Among BRICS, India and China have the distinction of being an economic success and powerful countries. Their cooperation is vital for any successful future endeavor of BRICS. But unless Beijing and New Delhi dispel distrust, moderate their territorial issues, arrive at some form of accommodation, and improve their relations substantially, India would like to keep its good relationship with the West. It would be cautious of any BRICS initiative which might antagonize the West.
Moreover, three of the BRICS members, India, Brazil, and South Africa, also have a trilateral dialogue forum (IBSA). In the likelihood of accelerated and extended confrontation between Russia and the West and China and the US, India, Brazil, and South Africa may find it in their national and collective interests to recommit themselves more decisively to renewed IBSA summitry rather than become a casualty of BRICS. The West may try to strengthen IBSA through coercion or concessions to isolate Russia and China and create a rift within BRICS. Thus, unity among BRICS seems challenging, though imperative to achieve emerging powers’ global governance reformism.
The Ukraine crisis might lead to the realignment of BRICS and the possible emergence of a stronger BRICS. The reactions and sanctions of the West on Russia have created an impetus for more inclusive geopolitics, geo-economic and multipolar world. With India and China, two of the World’s leading economies, as its members, BRICS has the capabilities and resources to create the alliance of the global South and break the West’s domination and hegemony. BRICS should learn from the pandemic and the Ukraine crisis. It should be ready for joint responses to serious challenges such as the current global food crisis and the economic crisis predicted by the IMF and the World Bank.
Responding to the crises can only occur with political will and unity, which is becoming increasingly tricky among BRICS nations. Whether they can make use of this historic opportunity is to be watched.
So much is at stake for these five economies. The Ukraine conflict may end sooner or later. However, BRICS confronts a challenge in the form of territorial confrontation between India and China and their mutual incomprehension. Proforma, they carry out dialogue at the highest levels, but neither is wiser about the other’s motivations and compulsions.
BRICS as a group, despite all its strengths enumerated above, is too diverse politically and culturally to be the nucleus of a future global organization or a force to counter the West’s hegemony. But the current Sino-Indian mutual incomprehension carries the danger of turning this promising group into another SAARC.
The author is the Founder and Secretary-General of India China Economic and Cultural Council, New Delhi